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SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE

by the court: "Let them charge each person something so that no
244
person pays everything."
UNIRmom DIsTucT COURT Acr

UDCA article 2: District court has power to adjudicate title questions
for limited purposes.
In O'Friasv. Melton,2 45 the Second Department recently held that
a judgment on a question of title in a summary proceeding lacks res
judicata effect in a subsequent action brought to determine title in a
different court. The decision as to the district court's lack of jurisdiction was based entirely upon article 2 of the UDCA. However, although
the appellate division denied res judicata effect to the judgment, it
nonetheless sanctioned the district court's determination of title questions in summary proceedings for the limited purpose of settling
disputes raised in the particular proceeding. This is analogous to a
court's award of temporary alimony; the matrimonial trial court is not
bound by a prior decree for temporary alimony. 246 Both types of
"temporary" determinations are obviously creatures of practicality.
The O'Frias court did, however, find the district court's judgment had res judicata effect for quite a different reason. The parties
had incorporated in the judgment a stipulation relating to title. Had
the plaintiffs complied with the stipulation, they would have obtained
title to the property in question. But, having failed to do so, the
court held that their default precluded their bringing this action. This
holding is somewhat questionable because it seemingly permits the
parties to give the district court the requisite subject matter jurisdiction
247
which it otherwise lacks.
As recognized by the court, there existed still another basis for dismissing the complaint. After the summary proceeding, but prior to
this action, plaintiffs' action for specific performance was dismissed.
This dismissal was unquestionably res judicata since it was a determination on the merits. Therefore, this more logical and less radical
basis for the Second Department's holding supports the decision.
The decision is welcomed. A practitioner in summary proceedings
should no longer encounter delays occasioned by stays which were
necessary while a higher court determined the issue of title. Hence,
244 60 Misc. 2d at 499, 302 N.YS.2d at 698.
245 52 App. Div. 2d 1046, 303 N.Y.S.2d 785 (2d Dep't 1969).
246 7B M cKINNEY'S UDCA § 204, supp. commentary 14, 15 (1968).
247 See UDCA §§ 201, et seq.
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summary proceedings can proceed expeditiously to final judgment,
subject, of course, to occasional reversals by a superior court.
JUDIciARY LAw

Judiciary Law § 753A: Section narrowly construed.
Section 753A of the New York Judiciary Law empowers a court
of record to punish "a neglect or violation of duty, or other misconduct,
by which a right or remedy of a party to a civil action or special proceeding, pending in the court may be defeated, impaired, impeded, or
prejudiced.. .

."

Although the section obviously bestows broad powers

upon a court, it has been narrowly construed by a lower court.
The plaintiff-husband in Shapiro v. Shapiro248 moved to punish
the defendant-wife for failure to comply with the visitation rights
granted him in a final judgment of separation rendered by the Supreme
Court of Nassau County. This motion was made in the Supreme
Court, Nassau County-now the situs of a divorce action predicated
upon the judgment of separation. The divorce action was properly
before the court, and jurisdiction existed over both parties. Since the
Queens County Supreme Court would have a record of the final
separation judgment for purposes of making a determination in the
divorce action, it would appear that the most logical and practicable
place to make the motion would be in Queens County. However,
Justice Brown held that the court was without jurisdiction to hear
the motion and that plaintiff would have to move in the court that
rendered the judgment of separation. This decision was reached in
spite of plaintiff's urging that the motion should be granted in order to
safeguard his summer visitation rights from continued violation.
The decision finds support only by taking a narrow view of the
phrase "pending in the court" as it appears in section 753A. The court
defined it to mean the specific court hearing an action or rendering the
final judgment. However, the supreme court is one of general jurisdiction and designations as to venue do not limit the powers of the
court as to subject matter.2 49 Therefore, a more liberal and sounder
interpretation of the phrase would indicate that the Supreme Court
of Queens County had the requisite jurisdiction to entertain the
motion.
Moreover, it should be noted that this was a motion on notice.
248 60 Misc. 2d 622, 80 N.Y.S.2d 565 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1969).
249 See, e.g., 7B McKINNEY's CPLR 501, supp. commentary 11 (1969).

